Anti-occupation anti-constitution forces display strength
Also after a month of presumable intensive bargaining the electoral commission could not announce a result which would please the different Iraqi factions as well as the occupier. Despite countless claims of fraud a significant part of the contested seats goes to forces which not only oppose the US occupation (in Iraq nobody can openly support the occupation) but also to those who refuse the constitution dividing the country into three entities. Actually the real puppet forces of Allawi and Chalabi were reduced to a tiny minority. Despite all shouts of victory the US cannot record a significant step towards stabilisation.
1
What is true is that the Iraqi people is at least for the time being organised alongside the three entities of Shia, Sunni and Kurds the occupiers intended to strengthen in order to base a system of rule and divide on it. But the lines of divide are less incrusted than they seem. The contradictions within the communities themselves are stronger as reported and can under changed circumstances give way to a multi-confessional coalition against occupation aor as a maximum aim a resistance and liberation front. On the other hand the system of divide constitutes a problem also for the US. Some neo-con extremists might believe in their theorem of “creative chaos” but the success or failure of the US mission of “regime change” will be measured whether it will be able to create a stable puppet regime integrating Iraq with is enormous oil resources into the capitalist world economy thus radiating imperialist stability in the crucial region of the entire Middle East. This is not in sight and the election did not bring them significant steps ahead:
a) By now they have lost nearly the entire territorial control to different militias of which some are collaborating, But all follow their own agenda. Under changed circumstances the temporal coincidence of interest can vanish leaving the US with few in hand.
b) Especially their main pillar, the Iranian backed Sciri-Dawa coalition, will be no reliable partner in a military build-up against Iran. So the US hesitates to hand over to them the entire south as a kind of Iranian protectorate. On the contrary the Shia card, which used to be the key of the US intervention, could backfire. Already by now the movement of the poor masses led by Muqtada as Sadr has pledged to rise in case of an US attack on Tehran.
c) For all major US partners in the region the creation of statelets along “ethnic” criteria is considered a deadly threat for their own integrity. So by pushing too far in this direction they endanger their already shaky regional architecture as they actually did when attacking Afghanistan.
d) Their intention to withdraw into long-term bases ceding the day to day mediation of their rule to a reliable puppet regime according to the Afghan model requires at least a central government wielding decisive prerogatives. There is no such regime with the necessary military capability and popular consent which could survive without their daily intervention. Exactly the contradictions between the entities, which way have been fostering, impede this.
2
The elections not only bring to the light of day these contradictions they also testify that despite all kinds of fraud and distortions significant parts of the population not only refuse the occupation but also the constitution which is the concretion of the occupation. This is not only true for the Sunni environment but also for the Shiite one. Muqtada as Sadr, whose parliamentary groups is the strongest single faction, also is steadfast against the constitution. Meanwhile the Sciri-Dawa-Kurdish coalition aims at cementing the latter. Far from being settled the matter is due to explode further impeding a regime stabilisation.
But didn’t the armed resistance movement call for boycott which was not followed by their own constituencies? Isn’t that a set-back or even defeat for the resistance? This is the reading of the imperialist media. Obviously, if one starts from the assumption that the resistance de facto already represents a national liberation front and is close to drive the occupiers out – as some close to the resistance claim – then the results are indeed dire. But if one starts from the consideration that the resistance is limited to the Sunni areas and is experience great trouble to form a political representation then the results appear in a different light.
Exactly to fill the political vacuum also the Sunni people tended towards participation in the elections after the boycott of January 2005 did not pave the way to a resistance front for which Muqtada’s uprisings in 2004 had given hope for. They, however, did not go to the polls to confirm the occupation but to express their firm NO to it as did most the followers of Muqtada.
The problem is actually not that the people turned out to the polls but that there was no list directly or indirectly sanctioned by the resistance. So the collaborationist Islamic Party got a disproportional big role while there is no organic link to the lists to keep unavoidable opportunist tendencies in check.
While the US will do its best to forge a Sunni collaborating group in order to curb the resistance and to counterbalance the Shiite forces it is in no way given that they will conquer the support of the Sunni population. This depends whether the US will devolve significant power to them not only in the regions of Sunni predominance but also within the national state. The current “federalist” constitutional design must be abrogated – something the US does not want nor would their current partners of Sciri & Dawa accepted it. So they are messed up also on this front.
3
The political leaders of the resistance understand that the key to victory is a national liberation front which at any cost must include Muqtada as Sadr or at least significant parts of his constituencies. For historical reasons this is not easy and for the time being it seems to be blocked.
There are, however, some undeniable traces on this path. There is not only the co-operation during the double uprising in 2004 but there is the common refusal of the occupation as well as of the constitution. Despite the fact that the vote was along confessional lines this is a strong base of a supra-confessional i.e. national bloc. Several obstacles must be surpassed.
The contradiction between Muqtada on one hand and Sciri-Dawa on the other must grow and explode. Given the deterioration of the living condition of the poor masses for which the governing forces bear the responsibility this is an inexorable tendency. Then there are the reactions to a stepped up campaign against Iran. Certainly Muqtada will be more ready to attack the US in Iraq than Sciri-Dawa who want to eradicate the Iraqi resistance at any cost.
On the other side the resistance must overcome a certain militarist approach regarding politics in general as equal to capitulation. With this widespread approach within the popular self-organised resistance forces, which might coincide also with al Anbar anti-state traditions, they leave the political field also within the Sunni milieu to opportunist and even collaborating forces. Without a political front the people have no other means for political expression than voting for the forces running for the elections.
But the most important question is to assure to the popular masses – not only but first of all – that a political resistance front is not repeating the Baathist record of political exclusion. The unified anti-occupation force can only win if they counterpoise to the “democracy” imposed by the US a model of popular power which provides participation to the poor classes. This is the key to bridge the historic gap between the resistance and Muqtada’s movement.
Anti-imperialist Camp
January 28, 2006
