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The International Character of the War in Ruanda from 1990 to date

6. October 2001

by Christopher C. Black

September 2001

INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE WAR
IN RWANDA FROM 1990 TO DATE

1. Introduction

1.1. In the indictment against the political prisoners held by the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, seated at Arusha, Tanzania, all Hutus, the Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, starts with the 1959 Revolution. But she deliberately avoids setting out the causes of the Revolution, its development and the reactions of the Tutsi feudal monarchy in power at the time. She passes in silence over the massacres of Hutus and the tortures of the Hutu leaders, whose only crime was that of fighting for the equality and the human rights for the Hutu people. In the result, the Prosecutor has created, especially for the judges of the ICTR, a Manichean vision of the Rwandan political conflict;. on one side, the Tutsi who are portrayed as innocent victims, and on the other, the Hutu who are portrayed as malicious killers, incapable of dialogue.

1.2. In drawing up her indictment, Del Ponte passed over the attack against the plane carrying President HABYARIMANA without comment. Her predecessor, Louise ARBOUR, obstructed justice and became an accessory after the fact to murder when she killed the investigation into the shoot down of the plane and concealed the report drawn up by one of her own investigators, Michael HOURIGAN, who identified the so-called Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi force that invaded Rwanda from Uganda, and a foreign power, for the attack. Since the departure of Louise ARBOUR, her successor, Del Ponte continues to participate in this coverup by claiming against all logic that the investigation concerning the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and everyone on board the plane that carried them is not within the Tribunal´s competence. She claims this despite the April 21, 2000 statement by Jean Pierre MUGABE that the attack was carried out by the RPF, supported by a foreign power that nobody wants to reveal and despite the unanimous opinion of all the experts who have appeared before the Tribunal that the assassination of the president of Rwanda was the trigger for all the events of 1994 in Rwanda. She persists in her twisted logic of considering the Tutsi as victims in order to protect the powerful States actually involved in the war. Her excuse of a lack of competence is a crude way of avoiding the truth and is a complete distortion of the Tribunal´s mandate as set out in its Statute and the Security Council resolutions that created it.

1.3. The Prosecutor concludes her indictment by claiming that the war against Rwanda was an internal war, as does the Security Council in its resolutions creating the Tribunal, thereby ignoring the role played by the States which intervened actively and openly in the war in violation of international law and at the same time, acting outside the authority of the UN itself which has authority to act only in situations of international conflict not internal, national conflict. It is clear, however, that several States took part in the conflict, both actively and openly as well as covertly, by training the RPF, by providing it funds and weapons, by carrying out a media and economic war against the Rwandan Government, and by providing military forces that took part in the invasion of Rwanda. Moreover, these same powers thwarted, boycotted, then finally refused to examine the complaint lodged by the Rwandan government with the Security Council that it was being attacked by the forces of foreign powers in particular its complaint against Uganda which was the most important of the local powers that supported the RPF invasion.

The object of this study is to show that the judicial notice( ) taken by the judges of the Tribunal in the Semanza case that the war in Rwanda was an internal one, is more than suspect. taking into account all available information. It shows instead that the conflict was an international.

2. The Arguments That War For Rwanda Was An Internal One

The Prosecutor and the Judges of the ICTR who have pronounced on the character of the war that occurred in 1994 base their position on information that is untrue, incomplete and never debated either legally or factually. Firstly, this information fails to lead to the truth because of the truncated period of the conflict they are willing to examine having regard to the time rationale of the Tribunal. Indeed, the Prosecutor and the Judges decided, without justification, that the part of the conflict within their mandate covers the period from January 1 to July 17, 1994, (yet still inexplicably claiming the shoot down of the plane on April 6, 1994 is not within its competence!) whereas the competence of the Tribunal under its Statute covers the period of the January 1 to December 31, 1994. The RPF took power by force of arms on July 17, 1994. The fact of taking power by force and then forming a government does not mean that the war was finished and that no crimes under the Tribunal´s jurisdiction were committed after that date. That position has the sole objective of covering up the crimes committed by the RPF after July 17, 1994 and is unacceptable if the objective is to discover the truth. After July 17, the RPF was able to commit crimes against humanity completely unopposed and without attention since more than half of the Rwandan population was in exile. Moreover, the information which constitutes the foundation of the ICTR judges´ position on the “internal” character of the war in Rwanda, consists of nothing more than spurious and arbitrary assertions, unsupported by any tangible evidence. They base their position on the following reports and decisions of judges of the Tribunal in the following cases.
– The judgement in the AKAYESU case, paragraph 174
– The judgement in the KAYISHEMA case, paragraph 597.
– The judgement in the RUTAGANDA case, paragraph 382
– Provisional report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
– Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
– Report of R. Degni SEGUI, Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human rights.
A careful analysis of these documents shows the weakness, even the total absence of arguments or evidence capable of supporting the thesis adopted by the ICTR judges and by various commissions of the United Nations.

2.1 Paragraph 174 of the judgement in the case of Jean Paul AKAYESU, the paragraph that deals with the subject, is based on one simple assertion of General DALLAIRE who stated before the Trial Chamber that “the FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and the RPF were ” two armies ” between which there existed an armed conflict, that the RPF had troops systematically deployed and placed under the orders of a command entrusted to Paul Kagame and that the FAR and the RPF occupied different parts of a clearly delimited demilitarised zone. Such an assertion proves absolutely nothing as far as the character of the conflict is concerned. General Dallaire was never asked, by anyone, about the role played in the war by states remote or close to Rwanda. If Dallaire´s declaration is not a priori false, it is certainly incomplete as far as the question of who was involved in the conflict is concerned. Questions were put to him by the prosecution counsel in a manner designed to prevent any examination of the interference of external powers in the territory of Rwanda The simple fact that there are two clear belligerents does not exclude the direct action or complicity of others.
2.2 In paragraph 597 of the judgement of Clement KAYISHEMA, the Chamber was content in stating that ” The Chamber considers that there is no need to consider this question. Indeed, it was established, beyond reasonable doubt, that there was in Rwanda an armed conflict with a non-international character. That armed conflict opposed governmental armed forces, the FAR, with the dissident armed forces, the RPF… “. The Chamber states that the RPF was a dissident armed force. Such an assertion implies that the RPF was a group, which was detached from the Rwandan Armed Forces, an internal force, which is far from the truth. The Judges and Prosecutor did not want and still do not want to know, or more appropriately, let it be revealed, who created the RPF and who provoked, financed and materially supported the war. The rationale of the Judges is without any intellectual merit and is a complete obfuscation of the truth.
2.3 Paragraph 382 of the judgement of George RUTAGANDA (N° ICTR –96-3-T) is more than laconic : ” The Chamber considers as established that for the period referred to in the indictment, there was in Rwanda an internal armed conflict, and endorses the conclusions drawn in this respect in the Akayesu judgement ” This statement is without further comment. The jurisprudence of the Trial Chamber consists only of blank pages. The Judges in the RUTUGANDA case base their judgement on a simple assertion made in the judgement in the Akayesu case that the question of the character of the conflict was solved when in fact that conclusion in the judgement in the Akayesu was never argued. The Judges never even discussed the argument presented by the prosecution and the DALLAIRE´s declaration was not thoroughly analysed.
2.4 The provisional report of the Commission of Experts of October 1994 also skated over the character of the conflict in paragraph 91. The Experts write as follows. “The armed conflict between the period 6 April and 15 July 1994 qualifies as a non-international armed conflict. The use of armed force had been carried out within the territorial borders of Rwanda and did not involve the active participation of any other State. Third State involvement entailed peacemaking and humanitarian functions rather than belligerent action.” However, the Experts do not deny that this war could involve serious effects on the neighbouring States, for example through the flow of refugees. If the Experts declare that no other state was implicated in the conflict, it is because it is not the truth that interests them, but the protection of the very states who were involved. These same “Experts” did not carry out any investigation before making their assertions notwithstanding that they had a basis and reason for conducting such an investigation; the complaint made by Rwanda to the Security Counsel in May of 1994 against Uganda that it was directly involved in the invasion of Rwanda. The “Experts” thus did not have the will or the permission to investigate whether or not another State was involved in the conflict. To maintain, as they do, that the involvement of other States was for humanitarian reasons and for maintaining peace reaches the level of fantasy.
2.5 Paragraph 108 of the Experts Final Report issued in December 1994 was formulated in the same terms as paragraph 91 of the provisional report. The “Experts” did not change their position despite the accumulation of evidence demonstrating the involvement of several foreign powers in the war.
2.6 R. Degni Sà©gui, in his report, addresses the character of the conflict in paragraphs 54 and 63 of his report.. However, in paragraph 54, he deliberately avoids characterising the conflict, and only speaks of two parties to the conflict, while claiming that the Geneva Conventions apply. He did not even try to determine whether or not one or more States were involved in the conflict. His assertion that there were two parties to the conflict is made without any basis that could be accepted by an impartial ICTR. Sà©gui did not prove anything. Paragraph 63 of his report relates to those responsible for violations of human rights, but it too does not define the conflict in a way that is useful and credible. Besides, this paragraph must be read and interpreted with caution. Indeed, in its fourth subparagraph, the caution of the author of the report with respect to his own findings is clearly revealed. He writes as follows. ” Some light needs also to be shed on the responsibility of some foreign States and to their interference in Rwandese politics.” The Rapporteur thus refers to the interference of foreign States in the Rwandan politics. This should constitute a starting point for an independent and impartial investigation, but the political will does not exist even though the United Nations and its Commissions still have before them, totally ignored, the complaint from the Rwandan Government against Uganda before the Security Council and before the Organization of African Unity.

The Prosecutor and the Judges of the ICTR have no basis to maintain that the conflict which occurred in Rwanda was internal and non-international. The fact that a war occurs within the territory of a country is not a sufficient criterion to characterise it as an internal war. Wars of aggression always take place, at least in their first phase, on the territory of the attacked country, but one cannot qualify them internal on the basis of this only criterion only. The significant fact is the involvement of one or several States in the conflict. It is the objective of the points which follow to prove that there was such involvement in the conflict which occurred in Rwanda and the Congo throughout the eleven years the war has lasted.

3. Pretexts For War And Efforts To Avoid It

On February 8, 1988, during a state dinner in Kampala attended by President HABYARIMANA, President MUSEVENI raised the question of the Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda from Rwanda after they failed to suppress the popular revolution of 1959-61 and who had lived in Uganda since. During the dinner he threatened Rwanda that if it did not find a solution Uganda would. As a result, the two countries decided to create a joint commission to study and solve this question. In February 1989, the discussions reached an advanced stage following which Rwanda then created the SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF EMIGRES, the desire being to reach a global solution for the problem of Rwandans living in foreign countries, especially those close to Rwanda .
Two well known Tutsi figured prominently as members of this Commission: Pierre Claver KARENZI, professor at the National University of Rwanda, member of the Central Committee of the MRND and President of the Commission of that party in charge of Educational and Scientific Affairs and, as well, Antoine NTASHAMAJE, previously President of the Council of State, then Minister of Institutional Relations since January 15, 1989. Although refugees returned regularly, voluntarily and in an appreciable numbers on their own, the Commission had the mission of accelerating the process. Among actions taken by this Commission, it is necessary to mention the proposal for a general amnesty for all people having carried weapons against Rwanda, so that the refugees did not have fear to be prosecuted, because some of them had fought in the ranks of Inyenzi (Tutsi forces raiding Rwanda) This proposal was adopted and the law was adopted by the Rwandan Parliament in 1991.
A meeting on the conclusion of an agreement between Rwanda, Uganda, the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and the Human Rights Commission of the UN on the return of the refugees took place between the 27th and 30th of July, 1990. The central points of this agreement were as follows.

1° the refugees who so wish may return to Rwanda ;
2° the Rwandan Government will find places and prepare the infrastructure for accommodation ;
3° the HCR is to conduct a census of the refugees wishing to return to Rwanda ;
4° a delegation of Rwandan refugees is to go to Rwanda on September 28, 1990, at the expenses of the Rwandan Government, in order to visit the country and provide its opinion on the infrastructure set up for the accommodation of the returning refugees.

This agreement, resulting from much effort and sacrifice, was without a future. Indeed, while Rwanda committed itself to the task assigned to it, the RPF (the so-called Rwandan Patriotic Front, the armed fist of the Tutsi revanchists) used its energy to sabotage the agreement. It opposed the census of the refugees who wished to return and threatened HCR officials with assassination if they continued the census. The delegation of refugees which was to visit Rwanda on September 28, 1990 never arrived and the HCR did nothing to encourage it. Instead, two days later, October 1, 1990, Ugandan-RPF troops massed at the Rwanda-Uganda border and invaded Rwanda but were repelled; the piles of corpses they left behind mute eloquence to their vicious and unprovoked aggression. Thus began the war; a war which Rwanda did not wish, did nothing to provoke, and did everything to avoid.

It took place because certain countries such as Uganda had an immediate interest in the conquest of Rwanda by the RPF and the soldiers who took part in the first invasion were members of the NRA, the Ugandan army, whose officers held high positions within the Ugandan army. It was the objective of Museveni and powers outside Africa that this aggression take place in order to find the final solution to the Tutsi-Hutu problem, the elimination of the majority of the Rwandan population, the Hutu, in order to secure the hegemony of the Tutsi minority from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi over the region as a quid pro quo for the RPF assisting those foreign powers in taking control of the resources of Central Africa primarily, the Congo.

4. The Concept Of Aggression And Its Criminal Character In International Law.

In its resolution N° 3314 of December 14, 1974, the General Assembly, by consensus, defined aggression and drew up a list of acts of aggression . In particular, article 3 defines an act of aggression as an “invasion or attack upon the territory of a State by armed forces of another State, or any military occupation, even temporary, resulting from such an attack or any annexation by the use of force of the all or part of the territory of another State. ”
The same article at subparagraph G states as follows ” the sending by a State itself or on its behalf of armed bands or groups, irregular forces or mercenaries whose purpose is to commit acts of armed force against another State so grave that they are equivalent to the acts enumerated above, or the fact of engaging in a substantial way in such an action”. “Article 5, subparagraph 2 stipulates that ” a war of aggression is a crime against international peace. The aggression gives rise to international responsibility”.
The reading of the articles mentioned above requires the following observations.

4.1 The elements which attacked Rwanda were members of the NRA, the army of Uganda. Among the senior officers who took part in the attack were the following, all later officers in the RPF.
Major-General Fred RWIGEMA, who was initially Commander of the NRA and Vice-Minister of Defense in the Uganda government and head of the military operations in the north of Uganda;
Paul KAGAME, who was a Major and Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence in the Ugandan Army;
BAYINGANA, who was a Major and head of the health services of the NRA ;
Major Chris BUNYENYEZI, who was Commander of a brigade of the NRA in the East of Uganda ;
Major Samuel KANYEMERA, alias KAKA, who was Commander of Military Police in Kampala ;
Lieutenant-colonel Adam WASWA, a senior officer in the NRA ;
Major NDUNGUTSE, alias NDUGUTEYE ,alias KALISOLISO, who was a Ugandan Navy Commander;
Major Jean Bosco NYIRIGIRA, captured on the battlefield, who declared that he was Commander of the 310th Brigade of the NRA based at SOROTI.
Captain KAYITARE , who was aide-de-camp to General RWIGEMA.
Captain MUHIRE, an officer of the Museveni´s Presidential Guard;
Captain NGOGA, an officer in the Presidential Guard;
There were also combatants of Ugandan origin, such as Lieutenant LUTALO Alex, GASORE John Paul and Musa GANAFA who also later turned up in the RPF.

All the attackers were holding military identification cards of the NRA and their leave cards were signed by Ugandan military authorities. Museveni even acknowledged the aggressors against Rwanda were members of his army.

4.3 It is not essential that the attackers are members of a regular army. It is enough that they are sent by a State or that they attack on its behalf. Admittedly, Uganda claimed that the elements of its army that attacked Rwanda had deserted and stolen arms, munitions and equipment. But no theft of military material capable of destroying a state can occur with impunity, without the State exacting sanctions and the cover story of a mass desertion, put out by the government of Uganda, cannot be believed. Indeed, the fact that a deserter denies his status as combatant or as a member of the army to which he belonged before, does not remove this status. A deserter remains under the influence of the military legislation of the State in which he exerted his functions unless he has juridically broken any bond with that State . The “deserters” who attacked Rwanda using the materià¨l of the Ugandan Army were never sanctioned by Uganda. They never gave up their Ugandan nationality nor their military and state functions. Their legal bonds with the Uganda State and with its army were never broken. It is clear that Uganda played an active and essential role in the attack on Rwanda and made the war an international conflict .
In addition to the direct aggression perpetrated by a State, jurisprudence knows four categories of attackers whose acts engage the responsible State; armed groups which act in the name of the State, armed groups which are under the control of the State, deserters, and armed groups which do not have bonds of subordination, but have nevertheless bonds of nationality or of residence with the responsible state . It is crystal clear that the relationship between the RPF and Uganda meets these conditions. This fact is further proved by the fact that Museveni openly acknowledged his country´s attempts to destabilize the Region of the Great Lakes. There is no doubt that the aggression against Rwanda, the beginning of this destabilization, took place with the approval and under the direction of President Museveni. As soldiers of the Uganda army, the NRA, the attackers of Rwanda were under the direct control of the Uganda State. President Museveni recognized that the attackers of Rwanda were members of the NRA, though claiming they were deserters. These “deserters” were never punished, on the contrary, they continued to profit from the facilities of Museveni and his army. The bonds of subordination of the high command of the RPF with the Uganda State are obvious, since they held high positions in the Ugandan army at the same time. The attackers were all Ugandan citizens. They had Ugandan passports and travelled to many countries throughout the world during the war using those passports. Uganda never cancelled these passports, nor asked the international community to be take steps against the holders of those passports. Lastly, the attackers were residents of Uganda, without exception.

4.4 UN resolution 3314 qualifies aggression as a crime that gives rise to international responsibility. In fact, under the Nuremberg Principals, unprovoked aggression is a crime against peace and, as it leads to all other war crimes, is the most serious of all war crimes. It is beyond doubt that Uganda is guilty of a crime against peace by supporting the invasion of Rwanda by the Tutsi elements of the Ugandan army.

5 Concept of Participation In Criminal law And Its Application To International Law.

Participation in a crime occurs in two ways: direct participation or aiding indirectly or indirectly in the commission of the crime.
At the time of the aggression against Rwanda, the RPF was not a known entity. All that existed was the NRA, the Ugandan army whose members conducted the attack. Without the supply of weapons, logistics, troops and training by Uganda backed by other countries, such as Britain and the United States the aggression could not have taken place. This complicity continued in 1996, when Uganda and Rwanda attacked Zaire and was renewed when Kagame and Museveni decided to attack the Congo of President Laurent Kabila in 1998. This co-operation between the RPF led by Kagame and his godfather in Uganda stopped only in 2000, when troops of Rwanda and Uganda clashed in Kisangani, because of a divergence in the financial, strategic, geopolitical and hegemonic objectives of the two dictators.
Uganda was not simply an accessory, but a joint author of the aggression, if not the initiator of the aggression against Rwanda. But Uganda did not act alone in supporting the RPF aggression against Rwanda. Other States committed acts crimes against peace directly and indirectly against Rwanda and all of Central Africa by also supporting the RPF forces. The intervention of all these countries is so obvious so that no one can persist in qualifying the war of 1990 – 1994 and its continuation today as an internal conflict.

6. Acts that constitute the crime of aggression

6.1 Direct aggression: the launching of the armies of one state onto the territory of another with the purpose of conquest or occupation whether those armies are stationed on its own territory or the territory of another state close to the state being attacked. In the latter case the state from which the aggression is launched is as responsible as the state whose forces commence the aggression. This is the case of the great powers, such as the United States which has land, naval and air bases in other States and which uses them to attack another State as occurred in the attack by the United States against Iraq and for which Saudi Arabia shares responsibility.
6.2 Indirect Aggression: The placing of its territory at the disposal of another State for an aggression; or the sending of armed irregular groups to attack another State. In the case of Bay of the Pigs the responsibility of the United States is evident since the “the armed groups” came from the United States and were trained, armed and sent by this power to invade Cuba. It is necessary to also understand as indirect aggression, the act of supporting these armed groups in order to avoid their defeat as occurred recently in Macedonia when American forces intervened in fighting between the Albanian terrorists and Macedonian government forces in order to avoid the terrorists´ defeat and the death or capture of American soldiers assisting the terrorists . Museveni did the same thing several times in clashes between the RPF and Rwanda government forces when the RPF was at risk of being defeated as he acknowledged.
6.3 Indirect Aggression By Other Means: Under this category is included diplomatic and active media support, the making of propaganda.. This type of support, while useful, is not essential for the aggression, since the success of the aggression depends principally on the forces and weaponry available.

The great powers which are the first to commit crimes against peace have a practical immunity and have various ways of avoiding accusations of direct participation, which is an essential circumstance permitting their aggressions to take place. The most striking example on the continent of Africa is the aggression conducted against Zaire (later the Congo) by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, supported by the United States and Britain, which the Security Council, dominated by the United States, has refused to recognize as aggression. by those countries. Instead it labelled Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, the countries that came to the assistance of the Congo at its request, as aggressors, a striking example of the use of the Security Council by the great powers to both commit acts of aggression with impunity and to cast the blame for that aggression on those that resist it..

7. States involved in the aggression against Rwanda and their role in the aggression
The States involved in the aggression against Rwanda are numerous, but they do not have the same level of responsibility.
It is well known that the Britain supported Museveni and the RPF and that it trained the troops of the NRA and the RPF at the base at Jinja in Uganda and helped prepare the attack against Rwanda. It also provided the short wave radio transmitters which was used for propaganda during the war by Radio Muhabura, the RPF propaganda radio that broadcast into Rwanda to undermine the regime and create tensions between Hutu and Tutsi.
Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Belgium, the United States, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fun all provided essential support for the aggression : they placed at the disposal of the NRA and the RPF, everything needed to make successful the destruction of the Rwandan regime: money, weapons, troops, and training, as well as diplomatic and media support. In various degrees, these States and these International Financial Organizations are joint authors and accessories to the criminal aggression perpetrated against Rwanda and its people.

7.1 Uganda
The war started from this country bordering Rwanda to the north. The day before his departure to Washington, on September 26, 1990, Museveni ordered Fred Rwigema to give the signal “to the boys” as Museveni called the forces that attacked Rwanda. The aggression was even more criminal since Uganda and Rwanda as Sovereign states had signed an agreement setting out the terms of a solution for the problem of the refugees .
Museveni made a series of criminal provocations against Rwanda in preparation of the attack.
At a secret meeting in the State House in Entebbe, he placed under the direct authority of his brother SALIM SALEH, a Ugandan general, two training camps of 600 men to be disguised as Rwandan soldiers, who were given the mission of destabilizing the border regions between Tanzania and Zaire, in order to create tensions in the relations between Rwanda and these two countries.
From 1986, Rwanda was the target of a series of attacks by the NRA, to test the capacity for response of the Rwanda Army and to provoke Rwanda, in reaction, to take the initiative in hostilities to justify the commencement of a war. However Rwanda refused to react to these provocations beyond its own self-defence so that Museveni had to change his strategy and plan on direct aggression. Here are some examples of incursions of the NRA on the Rwandan territory:
On August 19, 1986, the NRA attacked the locality of Rurenge. Two people were killed and two wounded. On September 12, 1986, Rurenge was once again attacked and one person was killed. On February 13, 1989, the Uganda army conducted attacks against Butera, in the Shonga sector, at Muvumba commune. In September 1989, there were two consecutive attacks at the home of a man named Bizeze and Paul Turatsinze, respectively in the sectors of Shonga and Rukoma in Muvumba commune. On October 6, 1989, the NRA attacked at Karyabwizi and Kamuhagire, in Ngarama. October 9, 1989 they, attacked ranch Bubare II in Muvumba commune. On April 5, 1990, they attacked the commercial center of Karama as well as the locality of Rukomo in Muvumba commune. On the same date, they attacked at Bishyundu and at Uwinkoko ranch in the Kazaza sector, commune of Muvumba. On April 16, 1990, they attacked at Karegesa in the Karama sector in Muvumba commune.

Meetings held at both the political and military level between the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities to deal with these attacks were fruitless. The attacks continued. On October first, 1990 at 10 o`clock a.m. the NRA openly attacked Rwanda in force and closed the Northern Corridor supply route into Rwanda, another act of aggression under international law.. . This history demonstrates that Uganda had prepared its aggression for a long time.
In spite of repetition, let us restate the following facts.
The attackers were members of the NRA. They had and still have Ugandan nationality
Uganda did not take any sanction against supposedly the deserters ; Uganda placed its territory at the disposal of the RPF throughout all war. Until April 1992, the RPF did not possess any part of Rwandan territory. It used Ugandan territory for training, attacks and sanctuary and, when carrying out the international plot, the godfathers of Museveni put in place the cease fire permitting the RPF to occupy a portion of Rwandan territory in order to negotiate from a position of strength, the RPF still used Ugandan territory as its base of military operations, and for the resupply and transportation of weaponry and troops and other provisions as well as for the evacuation of its wounded and sick.
In August 1992, the Private Secretary of Museveni, Innocent Bisangwa-Mbuguje as well as the Ugandan Ambassador in Washington, Stephen Kapimpina-Katenta-Apuuli, were arrested at Orlando, Florida trying to buy 400 TOW missiles and 34 TOW missile launchers for 18 million dollars on behalf of the RPF. The American Government´s involvement in the conflict was not allowed to be examined as they were immediately freed under the pretext of diplomatic immunity, a rule of international law that the United States is notorious for not respecting in other cases notably when they invaded Panama and murdered over 4,000 civilians in order to arrest General NORIEGA, President of Panama, to “judge” him in the United States for dealing in drugs.
On August 10, 1999, Christophe HAKIZABERA, a former officer of the RPF, made the following revelations; The RPF had a training School in Kabale and Masaka in Uganda. There was also a center of instruction for troops, located at NAKIVALE, close to the old camp of the Tutsi refugees. It is there that all the Tutsi recruits were trained and formed into units who came from Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and elsewhere. The authorities of Uganda who were well-informed did nothing to break up these camps. It is in Uganda that the meetings were held to plan the assassination of President HABYARIMANA. The first was held in Kabale, under the auspices of Monseigneur HARELIMANA , a catholic bishop and a Tutsi of Rwandan origin. The second meeting took place in the residence of the General Salim SALEH, half-brother of Museveni . General SALEH is member of the Ugandan army and he did not fail to inform his brother. The last preparatory meeting concerning the assassination of President HABYARIMANA took place in BOBO DIOULASSO in BOURKINA FASO.

On December 11, 1992, President Museveni organized a secret meeting in the State House in Entebbe between the RPF, the NRA, Colonel John Garang, of the FERA (an opposition movement in Kenya) and promised them logistical and political support It is known that Museveni has always engaged in the war against Sudan at the side of John Garang, with the financial support of the United States. In August-September 1993, Museveni led another meeting in the State House in Entebbe, in order to plan the assassination of Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda, Mobutu of Zaire and Arap Moi of Kenya. At the meeting were three representatives of the RPF, three of the Burundian Army, including the Head of State Major Jean Bikomagu, the Tanzanian Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Joseph Rwegasira, as well as Major Gà©nà©ral A. Kombe, Director of the Tanzanian Intelligence Service later shot down on the road near Kilimanjaro while trying to flee to Kenya by an assassination unit of the Tanzanian police who claimed they mistook him for a car thief. He was eliminated because, not being a Tutsi, he was suspected as being the one who revealed the assassination plot conceived during this meeting.
The truth about Uganda´s involvement has been revealed in other forums, for example in an open letter of February 1999 to the Western media the Association AVE shows Uganda to have carried out the aggression against Rwanda, jointly with the RPF. Even the Christian Science Monitor of Wednesday January 29, 1997 denounced, under the pen of the American of Congress, Mervyn DYMALLY, the plot of the Tutsi leaders of the Great Lakes region. He claims that it was with the assistance of Museveni that KAGAME liquidated the Hutu regime of Rwanda and that BUYOYA successfully carried out his coup d`etat in Burundi. He also stated that the United States supported this criminal action by training forces and supplying materials.
In its publication of July 10, 1998 in Buzet in Belgium, S.O.S Rwanda-Burundi, five times times accused Uganda of joining in the RPF attack on Rwanda. This association speaks about “Uugandan-RPF troops”. S.O.S Rwanda-Burundi first formulated its charges in its open letter of June 30, 1998.
The Rwandan Government announced as of October 1990, the sponsorship and the direct implication of Uganda in the aggression against Rwanda. In addition to all the attackers carrying military cards of the NRA, there were among the attackers soldiers of Ugandan origin and members of the NRA. In the face of this accusation, Museveni cynically declared that he knows these “boys” and that he doubts that the Rwandan forces can overcome them. ” I doubt very much that the troops that are there can defeat the rebel force. Some of them are our best people. ” It is a notorious public fact that the SIMBA battalion of the Ugandan army fought right up to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda during the fighting of 1994.
Uganda disregarded the principle of “Pacta sunt servanda” . Indeed, the Convention of the OAU of 1969 on refugees, especially in article 3 subparagraph 2 prevents States from allowing refugees to attack another State, in particular by the use of weapons, or through the newspaper and radio broadcasting. At the time Museveni was a President of the OAU and was obliged to apply the Conventions of the Organization.
The Rwandan Government accused Uganda of these crimes at the Summit of Abuja in July 1991. This complaint led to the creation of the GOMN . The mission of the GOMN was : to prevent the attacks coming from Uganda and to submit a report to the Secretary-general of the OAU in the event of further attacks coming from Uganda in order to lower the tension between Rwanda and Uganda, tension which could lead to a direct conflict between the two States and to create conditions favourable for technical negotiations for a cease-fire recommended by the OAU. But on the night of the 7th to the 8th of February, 1993, while the Rwandan Government and the RPF negotiated the Arusha Peace Agreements, Museveni sent about 3 battalions, including the famous Simba battalion, to support the RPF in an attack launched in violation of the cease-fire in the prefectures of Byumba and Ruhengeri. Museveni also chose this moment to send a message to the RPF delegation at Arusha that was intercepted by the Tanzanian intelligence services. The message was intended for Patrick Mazimpaka, who is currently the Special Envoy of President Kagame and it said;.
“Don`t sign the peace agreement. I want you back at Mulindi immediately and resume fighting.”
In May 1994, Rwanda filed a complaint with the Security Council against Uganda . The Council did not even condescend to put the matter on the agenda. Instead of examining this complaint, the Security Council instead decreed an embargo against the Rwandan Government, then created a Tribunal to try the Rwandan people for resisting the attacked by Uganda and the RPF.
Lastly, Museveni himself, in a speech given in Harare on August 9, 1998, recognized his participation in the war against Rwanda, and then against Zaire. He acknowledged to have been informed of the attack and that 4000 soldiers of Rwandan origin in the NRA began the organization of the armed aggression, under the direction of Fred RWIGEMA. He admitted to have helped the RPF materially. ” Uganda decided to help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda`s stability”. By complicity, the powerful States, themselves implied in the aggression did not want to recognise the participation of Uganda in the aggression against Rwanda thought it was obvious to everyone who had eyes. The active participation of the Ugandan soldiers in the war against Rwanda was confirmed by several other sources : statements of prisoners of war, messages intercepted by the Headquarters of the FAR. (the Rwandan Army). Units of the NRA took part in the attack of Kigali. The presence of the Simba battalion was confirmed by the statements of prisoners of war taken during the three month siege of Kigali.. The RPF forces at Kigali commanded by Colonel Kanyemera, alias Kaka, included white South-African mercenaries, whose purpose was to support the Uganda-RPF troops when in difficulty. On May 28, 1994, one Tutsi soldier captured close to Magerwa and named Jean de Dieu Habimana affirmed that his unit, the Alpha Battalion included 23 Ugandan military experts, working especially in weapons support

The participation of the Ugandan Army is also proven by the radio messages of the RPF intercepted by the Rwandan forces.
– Message of November 23, 1993 at 18 H 35 : Reinforce your positions and multiply your overall activities with the NRA in your provinces (RT INT/OPS/93/2445)
– Message of 30 November 1993 at 15 h15: Reorganize your troops and form mixed troops RPF-NRA before launching a large attack in order to reach the assigned places of the second city… (RT INT/OPS/93/2491 )
– Message of the 1st December 1993 at 14 H 50 : The Chief will give enough significant manpower for the operations starting from the country of the south (Burundi), but not the desired manpower because the NRA must intervene in LIBERIA in the Forces of interposition.(RT INT/OPS/93/2504).
– Message of the 1st December 1993 at 14 H 50 : Here it will be even more easy especially as the Chief (Museveni) will unceasingly make available the elements of the NRA in your respective provinces and the war will be carried out on several fronts. (RT INT/OPS 93/2504).
– Message of January 11, 1994 at 11 H 30 : The elements of the NRA who took part in the in intervention in North, at the border with Sudan have returned and will join you without delay (RT INT/OPS/94/080.
– Message of February 15, 1994 at 19 H 05 : The NRA will continue to work with us, but the manpower is reduced because of the case of Somalia and the rebellion in the country of the Chief (Museveni)… Be ready to act as soon as the instruction is given because for the moment we made the decision to take up arms because the war of October will find the solution within the framework of the military confrontations sanctioned by the victory of one of the parties. Courage to all. (RT INT OPS/94/295.
– Message of February 16, 1994 at 14 H 50 : Our troops are ready and the elements of the NRA are with you… Meanwhile, we intensify our reconnaissance activities in the Buffer zone and in the enemy camp… The NRA is with us. (RT INT OPS/94/311)
– Message of March 22, 1994 at 14 H 40 :… We continue our exercises. The elements of the NRA take part in it with less eagernes., The cause is the question of their reward after the war. Continue to work with NRA. (RT INT/OPS/94/565)
– Message of April 7, 1994 at 10 H 05 : Our troops and those of the NRA in our sectors remain on the alert. (RT INT/OPS/94/690)
– Message of April 9 1994 : The reinforcement and the supply in weaponry and food from the NRA will continue to reach you without problem. (RT INT/OPS/94/690)
– Message of April 11, 1994 at 13 H 20 : The reinforcement will reach you without delay and you have to collaborate closely with the NRA in your sectors. (RT INT/OPS/94/705)
– Message of April 15, 1994 at 11 H 20 : We intend to retain the battalion of the NRA as long as Belgium is not be able to give us the force able to support us against Rwanda… Helicopters and buses from NRA already arrived.. (RT INT/OPS/94/752). It should be noted that this message also implicates Belgium and that during the month of April, 1994 all the strategic points held by the Belgian paratroop contingent of UNAMIR(the UN Assistance Mission IN Rwanda)
– An RPF soldier captured in Gako confirmed that Ugandan soldiers supported the RPF and that staff of the RPF is supported by the Ugandans and the Belgians.
– A message collected on May 2, 1994 at 17 hours, announced that the efforts of new Rwandan governmental forces and their many patrols had ruined a counter-attack tried this night by the troops directed by Lieutenant Ndayambaje. Sixteen (16) Ugandans soldiers were put to flight. Two soldiers of which one was Ugandan were killed inadvertently by each other (RT INT/OPS/94/1232).
It would be tedious to continue the quotation of such messages whose clarity of meaning blinds the eyes. The complicity of the NRA is a fact that the RPF itself recognized and confirmed with all its combat units spread throughout the country.

7.2. The Participation Of Other States

At the beginning of hostilities in 1990, Belgium, France and Zaire sent troops to support Rwanda, even if the French and the Belgians were not on the front. These three countries know better than anyone the participation of Uganda and the hegemonic objectives of the Tutsi. When the former Belgian Prime Minister Maertens undertook to try to find a solution for this conflict, he started with Uganda. When Minister Claes wanted to bring the RPF to its senses in order to enter the institutions of transition, he went to see President Museveni . However, Belgium hastened to withdraw after a few weeks and allowed the official presence of a representative of the RPF in Brussels. Among the States which took part in the conflict alongside Uganda and RPF, there are several which took an active part in the assassination of the President HABYARIMANA, the event which triggered the resumption of the war and the tragic events which took place in Rwanda . The Prosecutor of the ICTR refuses to lead an investigation into this assassination, giving lack of jurisdiction as a reason; part of a conspiracy of silence. Such an investigation would open Pandora´s box and reveal the list of States and multinationals that took part in the war against Rwanda and in the assassination of its President. Actually, the RPF was only an instrument and still is for the destabilization of Central Africa, which is the reason why it continues to receive assistance and military support from outside and immunity for all the crimes it has committed from 1990 until today.

Burundi.

Since the Sixties, Burundi has been the sanctuary for the Tutsi combatants exiled following the Revolution of 1959. The multiple attacks which plunged Rwanda into mourning were always supported by the authorities of Burundi. It was the same during the attacks of October 1990. Burundi carried out the recruitment and the training of young Tutsi from Rwanda and Burundi to reinforce the ranks of the RPF. The Burundian Government took part in the war by providing to the RPF military, and material support as well as manpower. In 1992, the Burundian Army attacked the positions of the Rwandan army at Nemba in Bugesera. The town of Butare succumbed quickly to an RPF attack following the intervention of the Burundian Army. Moreover Prosecution witnesses admit before the ICTR having taken Rwanda, via Burundi, with the Burundi-RPF troops. On the 7th April 1994, after the assassination of Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, the FAR intercepted a message of the RPF specifying that the RPF had pulled it off thanks to the support of the Belgian friends and that he counted on the support of the Chief of Headquarters of the Burundi´s Army, Jean Bikomagu. But the complicity of Burundi and the RPF dates back a long time. It is necessary to note that in November 1990, during the negotiation of a possible cease-fire in Goma, the Adviser of the RPF was none other than Mr Jonathas NIYUNGEKO, General manager of the Political Affairs Office in Burundi´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The participation of Burundi in the war is confirmed by the message intercepted by the services of the FAR on May 4, 1994. In addition, this message attests to the presence of white combatants in the ranks of RPF, and specifies that ” ~ in the country of the South, our elements continue with preparations as agreed while waiting for the instructions. We must put ourselves together to fight against PALIPEHUTU-CDR in our region.” This message was broadcasted from Mbarara for the RPF units stationed in Kisoro, Kamwezi, Gatuna and Kasese .
In May 1994, when the Ugandan-RPF troops reached Bugesera, two battalions of the FAB (Forces Armà©es Burundaises), that is 1200 men, crossed the border of Kirundo and came in reinforcement onto Rwandan territory. They continued their progression towards Gitarama while passing by the bridge of Rwabusoro. If one adds to these testimonies the fact that the Chief of Headquarters of Burundi´s Army took part in the secret meeting to assassinate President Habyarimana, one cannot doubt about the active participation of Burundi in the war carried out against Rwanda.

Tanzania

We saw under the chapter relating to the participation of Uganda, that Tanzania had sent its Foreign Minister and Director of Intelligence to Kampala to take part in the plot to assassinate President Habyarimana. But from the very start of the hostilities, the town of Mwanza in Tanzania had become a center of recruitment, transit and training of the combatants of the RPF before joining the front. The Rwandan Government filed an official complaint to the Tanzanian Government, but it went nowhere mainly because of the intervention of General Mbita, Chief of the GOM and A. Salim SALIM, Secretary-general of the OAU, both of Tanzanian nationality and closely related to Museveni and RPF. After the assassination of the President of Rwanda on April 6, 1994, Tanzania confiscated the Rwandan planes which had carried the Rwandan delegation to the fatal meeting on that date. The official complaint of the Rwandan Minister for Transport met with silence. These planes were given to the RPF as soon as it seized the power in Rwanda. The authorities responsible for this act are the Foreign Minister, Joseph Rwegasira, and the Defense Minister, Colonel Abdalahaman Kinana. Not only were these unfriendly acts, they were also acts of aggression. Confiscating or blocking the means of transport of a country victim of aggression is aggression as well. Moreover, Tanzania hardly tried to hide its actions. A few days after the assassination of Habyarimana, former President Nyerere made a speech in which he blamed those who were involved with deaths of helping the RPF. As well, a contingent of the Tanzanian Army reinforced RPF troops in order to besiege the town of Kigali and for the conquest of the town of Kibungo. This city is close to the Tanzanian border and the Tanzanian soldiers had to do nothing else but cross the bridge of Rusumo on the Akagera river to take it.

Belgium

In addition to the opening of the office of the RPF in Brussels, Belgium promoted the conference of Brussels from May 29 to June 3, 1992, a conference which was really a betrayal in which the RPF and certain political parties in Rwanda sympathetic to the RPF (he MDR, the PSD and the PL) signed a collaboration Agreement. Belgium created an obstruction so that the MRND, the ruling party in Rwanda, which wished to take part was prevented from doing so. This agreement was signed on June 3, 1992 in Brussels. On June 5th, the RPF launched an attack against the town of Byumba, a city which it occupied for a few hours. Belgium did not condemn this attack. By sponsoring the conference of Brussels and by abstaining from condemning the attack on Byumba, Belgium helped the RPF by providing it with an alliance of the domestic political parties who were financed and supported from outside and had one objective, the destruction of democracy in Rwanda.

Knowing very well that the RPF was supplied weapons via Uganda, Belgium refused to deliver to Rwanda weapons and ammunition, which Rwanda had ordered and paid for from Belgiam well in advance. The principal component of UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda), Belgium was charged with the control of the comings and goings of the soldiers of the RPF between Kigali and Mulindi in the north. It was also responsible for safety in the city of Kigali. It however helped the RPF to infiltrate over 4000 combatants into the city of Kigali as well as a great number through the country. It helped to transport into Kigali from Mulindi, the missiles which were used to shoot down the plane of the President. This operation was carried out with the help of the Americans . Belgium helped the RPF to introduce heavy weapons in pieces, into Kigali. Colonel Marchal, commanding officer of the Belgian paratroopers recognized before the Belgian Senatorial Commission that when the RPF went to get firewood in north, they were really bringing in weapons .The Belgian component of UNAMIR refused any controls over these movements, because the weapons are not objects which can be hidden easily.
A captured RPF soldier at Gako, in the sub-prefecture of Nyamata, stated on May 1, 1994 that he was trained by the Belgians at Mulindi. It was the Belgians who taught the RPF the tactic of operating on the ground in squads of 5 to 10 men, while encircling a place to simulate a presence larger force. He specified that the organisation of the RPF was assured by the Belgians and Ugandans.
The review Africa International reported that “After the assassination of President Habyarimana, eyewitnesses within Kigali confirm that the soldiers of the RPF fight the Presidential Guard with equipment provided by the Belgian troops of UNAMIR. ” This charge is supported by the report of the Commander of the Bangladeshi contingent of UNAMIR, which shows UNAMIR to be partisan. He said UNAMIR is Belgium because they constituted the principal component. This Colonel of Bangladesh wrote: “the soldiers of Bangladesh were not aware that the United Nations had come to help the RPF to seize power in Rwanda nor took into account the attitude of the General DALLAIRE. General Dallaire authorized the troops of the RPF to occupy and ensure the safety of the zone of the United Nations at the Amahoro Stadium… UNAMIR takes part in the war in favour of the RPF. The heavy armaments fired from the United Nations buildings on the town of Kigali… ” This passage is brought closer in the account of the Belgian parartrooper, Goffin in his book Ten Commandos Will Die who fought at the Amahoro Stadium.
After the assassination of the President, the Belgian quota of UNAMIR handed over to the RPF all the strategic points which it occupied. Moreover, the Belgian para commandos fought at the side of the RPF mainly in Kigali . Belgium decided to withdraw its troops from UNAMIR and pushed the Security Council to withdraw all the troops of the United Nations of Rwanda, while the Rwandan Government beseeched the international community to help it to put an end to the massacres. On withdrawing, the Belgians handed over to RPF armaments as well as ammunition.
It is clear that the responsibility of Belgium is deep. It was a determining factor in the war.. Without it, the RPF would not have continued the war. It would not have conquered Kigali if the Belgians had not fought at its side. If Belgium had not created obstructions, the United Nations would have intervened, stopped the massacres and put an end to the hostilities.

The United States of America

This super power played a very significant role in the aggression against Rwanda. President Museveni served the interests of this power. It is through him that the weapons and the money passed. Training was also carried out under cover of Museveni. The training of Kagame and friends by the United States had as its purpose to attack Rwanda. They were informed of everything. It was the Ugandan Democratic Coalition directed by Remigius KINTU which was given the responsibility of liasing with the American authorities . When the war broke, the budget for the training officers for Uganda, of which Kagame was one, was increased from 150.000 to 400.000 American dollars . After the death of Fred Rwigema, Kagame was recalled from the military academy in the United States to take command of the RPF. The United States would not have sent him if they did not have an interest in avoiding the defeat of the RPF. The West has the purpose of using the Tutsi like unconscious instruments of the disorganization of their countries and the destruction of their people .
– At the end of March 1994, Prudence Bushnell , Arlà¨ne Render, Patricia Irving, all three civil servants of importance within the State Department, paid a secret visit in Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. In Kampala, they persuaded Museveni to convince President Mwinyi of Tanzania to call a summit to set a trap for those men targeted by the plot;. Mobutu, Moi, Habyarimana and Ntaryamira. Under these conditions, it should not be surprising that the investigation into the assassination of Habyarimana has been blocked completely.
On May 10, 1994, the office of the Under-secretary of State in charge of African Affairs telephoned the FAR Chief Staff, to invite it to lay down its weapons and to surrender.. In face of the refusal of the Chief of Staff the office responded: ” General, from now know that it is not RPF you will be fighting against, but the United States Of America. ”

In April 1994, the American participation in the aggression reached its climax. Indeed, the Ugandan-RPF troops profited from American logistics, as they have during the war which they conducted against the Congo. . American soldiers were in Rwanda. It is known that a shadow UNAMIR had been set up with American soldiers or their mercenaries (Romanian, Polish…) directed by American instructors in Belgian uniforms. This is the secret of UNAMIR, well-known to the Canadian General, Romeo DALLAIRE, commanding officer of UNAMIR. This shadow unit clearly helped the RPF to infiltrate into the Rwandan capital in preparation of the tragic events of April 6, 1994. UNAMIR´s true purpose was to supply intelligence of the positions of the government troops which were bombarded during the offensive of the RPF from April at July 1994 as well as to support the RPF in combat. It is that shadow UNAMIR which, on April 6, 1994, fired the missiles on the presidential plane for the benefit of RPF.

A power which ensures the training of the attackers, provides the weapons and logistics, takes part in the fighting and engages mercenaries to shoot down the presidential plane, and asks an army of an independent State to lay down its weapons and surrender cannot claim to have played no role in the war.

The Internationa Financial Institutions: The World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

These two International Financial Institutions controlled by the United States played a significant role in the conflict. Admittedly these two institutions are not States and are not subject to international law governing the relations between the States, but they are the creation of States and received the orders of certain States to take part in the war by financing one of the warring factions.
These two institutions took part in the war in two ways
O In financing the war by credits granted to Uganda ;
O In asphyxiating Rwanda by the refusal of credit, or any help and the pressure of the Stuctural Adjustment Programs.
The pressure of the World Bank was accentuated during the negotiations at Arusha, by the freezing of all credits to Rwanda, as long as the Agreement had not been signed.
At the beginning of 1994, the World Bank announced the suspension of all the credits to Rwanda, under the pretext that the Government was illegal. According to the Washington Post, the RPF received aid equal to that given to Rwanda over 27 years. The International Monetary Funds and the World Bank financed the war through Uganda.

Conclusion.

The preliminary report of the Independent Commission of the Experts, established following Resolution 935, decided against all the evidence, that the war of 1990 to 1994 was internal, because the use of the weapons proceeded inside the borders and that no other State was implied in the conflict. However, embarrassed by the clearness of the facts, the Commission added that this war had a serious impact on the close States as on the International Community. To arrive at such a conclusion, the Commission, financed by the great powers, had to ignore obvious facts, as described in the present paper.
The description of the role of Uganda, Belgium and the United States, of Britain, Burundi and Tanzania and of the international financial institutions, does not leave any doubt as to the guilt of these States and financial institutions for the crimes against peace they committed and the war crimes that took place under their eyes and control; the killing by the RPF and its allies of at least two million Hutus and thousands of Tutsis seen as collaborators of the Hutus and the tragic killings of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in reprisal by Hutus fighting for their lives. The use of the RPF cannot exonerate them from their responsibilities as joint authors and accessories to the crime of aggression.
By refusing to conduct an investigation into the assassination of President HABYARIMANA, the ICTR, the United States and Belgium do nothing but reinforce the culpability of those countries and organizations implicated in the war. The positive criminal acts of these countries, and their international organizations, including UNAMIR, were so essential and necessary to the RPF that without them, the aggression would not and could not have taken place. The RPF wanted power perhaps, but not suicide. That power was the price paid to the RPF by the extra African powers for the destabilization of Central Africa. The implication of the foreign powers speaks to the ambitions military-strategic and geo-political which motivated their actions, and explains the duration of the war for Central Africa which has lasted now eleven long years. One can taste those ambitions when one reads the recent report of the United Nations on the plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which highlights the culpability of certain multinationals as well as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.
By describing the conflict started by Uganda and RPF as an “internal” one, the ICTR does not provide a legal solution, but rather a political solution. As a judicial tribunal the ICTR should not have the capacity to endorse the conclusions of the commissions constituted with a political purpose; that is, to fulfill a political purpose for its political masters.

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