Resolution of the Anti-imperialist Camp on the occasion of the Iraqi elections of December 15, 2005
1)
The massive turnout at the elections of December 15, 2005, in the provinces of
the so-called Sunni Triangle (euphemism for the vast areas substantially
controlled by the resistance and inhabited by 40% of the population) have caused
the US and its hack writers to chant victory. They speak of a glamorous defeat
of the guerrilla.
2) Actually the
large participation must be explained not despite but because of the call by substantial
parts of the resistance to enter the electoral theatre in order to have elected
as many as possible delegates to the National Assembly.
3) This decision
follows the one adopted at the occasion of the October referendum on the
constitution, i.e. to go to the polls to say NO. The Iraqis know well that without
fraud in the provinces of Al Anbar, Salah ad Din, Niniwa, At Tamin, Dyala,
Baghdad the NO would have scored the majority.
4) The imperialist
press tries to advocate the theorem that the resistance does not have mass
character. They try to make believe that without the small groups protruding
into Iraq from outside the country would already live in peace. Apparently this
is nonsense. The armed struggle by dozens of forces is only the guerrilla
vanguard of a much broader political and social movement. Actually many towns,
villages and the vast zones not controlled by the occupiers have built a net of
representing organs and local committees constituting an outright territorial
counter-power. Under difficult and often desperate conditions (only to mention
the US incursions) they are charged with organising and administering social
life of the citizens.
5) It is known that
the Americans have been taught by Israel how to confront the Intifada. But as
Israel never succeeded in wielding full control over the Gaza strip and dozens
of West Bank towns, the US failed to establish their stable control over vast
territories and cities of Iraq. For example in the districts under command of
the Shia forces political and military control is neither exerted by the US
army nor by their Iraqi police but by different militias linked to political
forces like the movement of Muqtada as Sadr.
6) One could speak
of a stalemate. The US cannot defeat the resistance while the resistance faces
difficulties. Beside the international isolation (it is unprecedented that no
one single country is ready to host its political representation), beside the
obvious overwhelming military superiority of the US, the heart of the
difficulties boils down to the political strategy.
7) In Iraq a
protracted rural people’s war like in China or Vietnam is impossible. It
resembles more the Lebanese, Palestinian or Somalian experiences. The strategy
of the protected people’s war presupposes the consolidation of large completely
liberated zones which allows for the transformation of the guerrilla forces
into a regular liberation army in order to move on form the strategic defensive
to the offensive. In Iraq the role of the “strategic offensive” must be played
by the urban mass insurrection. Rise the urban masses is therefore the
imperative of the resistance. The insurrection in the cities requires the link
between the “Sunni” resistance and the Shiite population. Their union seemed to
have materialized in the insurrectional attempts of spring and summer 2004.
They were put down by the occupiers who eventually succeeded in dividing the
insurgents and in neutralising the radical Shiites of Muqtada as Sadr.
8) So we are right
know in a phase of impasse where the liberated rural and urban zones remain
exposed to enemy incursions while the advanced guerrilla detachments are
constrained to only apply hit and run tactics, to sabotage or to smaller
attacks – to hit one in order to educate hundred. What the armed resistance
indeed can do is to make life insecure for the occupiers, to demoralise them,
to spoil the US’ stabilisation attempts.
9) Only considering
this relationship of forces, this situation of stalemate, we can comprehend the
decision of large parts of the resistance to make use of the electoral
occasion. This tactical choice might allow to have a consistent group of
members of the National Assembly which will sabotage the puppet institution from
within set up by the occupier.
10) It is obvious
that this is a risky tactic. Also the US has undertaken a tactical turn. One
expression is their readiness to accept movements to run for the elections
which consider the resistance as legitimate (for example Saleh Mutlaq’s Iraqi
Front for National Dialogue). Originally the White House had chosen to
de-baathisize the country transferring power to the Shiite-Kurdish alliance.
Now they become aware of the fact that large parts of the Shia population does
in no way sympathise with the occupiers but follows leaders absolutely hostile
to the US (Muqtada as Sadr) or obey to Tehran like Sciri of al Hakim and of
Dawa led by the current prime minister al Jaafari which form the coalition
Iraqi United Alliance holding office together with the Kurds. This means that
beside the American incapacity to tame the resistance also the choice to
stabilise the situation by setting on the Shiite lever actually failed.
11) But it is not
only this double failure which pushes the US to change horse. To understand
this turn we must take the global imperial strategy of the US into
consideration. They did not only occupy Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein but
in order to redesign the entire Middle East. This plan sooner or later
comprises the ousting of the Islamic Republic in Iran (probably more along the
Ukrainian model then by means of an open aggression). That implies that they
cannot tolerate an Islamic Republic in Iraq allied with Tehran. But this is
exactly what the bulk of the Shiite movements are pushing for. Therefore they
criminally collaborated with the occupiers to chase away Baath but in order to pursue
their own goal and not the ones of Bush.
12) Only in this
context the opening up by the US towards the Baathist sectors of the resistance
can be explained (see the liberation of important Baathist figures in the last days).
En passant: it is well known how much the Baathists consider Iran to be an
absolute enemy (remember the fratricidal war of the 80s). Thus the occupiers
not only hope to divide the resistance but to bring these sectors on their side
as allies in a future escalation to bring down the Islamic Republic of Iran. If
this plan worked out, if parts of the old Baath (among them also Mutlaq)
accepted to form a coalition government together with the Kurds and Allawi’s
Iraqi National Accord it would not only be a crucial turn but also a tragedy.
We hope that the anti-imperialist components of the resistance will spoil this
plan.
13) The next weeks
will show (as well as the election results) whether the new US approach could
work out. Nothing is to be excluded. Certainly a possible electoral affirmation
of the lists close to the resistance would result in a push for them. While
they are being criminalized and ostracised as “terrorists” throughout the world
they would receive political legitimacy in Baghdad itself by a massive popular
consensus.
Anti-imperialist Camp
December 18, 2005
