Interview with Abduljabbar al Kubaysi, ex political prisoner of the
U.S., general secretary of the Iraqi Patriotic Alliance (IPA) and
mentor of a political front of the Iraqi resistance forces, speaks out
on the political prospective of the popular resistance movement against
the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
Q: What are your comments on the recent [December 2005] elections in Iraq?
Like all the other so-called elections staged by the U.S. and its puppets these too were nothing but a farce. They lack any legitimacy as the entire regime is illegitimate and illegal as it is imposed and kept in power by foreign occupation forces. This is why the resistance called for a boycott [of the elections].
The electoral campaign aggressively stirred up sectarian strife, which is in the interest of the occupier. The Sunni leaders who fell into this American trap mobilized their constituencies by pointing to the danger of the Shiites seizing power. The Shiite leaders did the very same thing, thus creating a spiral endangering the Iraqi national unity that we fight for.
From the side of the Sunni forces there was an especially great amount of deceit. They promised that if the people went to the polls and elected their representatives to parliament, this would allow them to change the constitution, which was imposed by fraud against the will of the overwhelming majority in the Sunni provinces. But they knew from the very beginning that even with a maximum turn-out they would never be able to achieve the necessary parliamentary quorum to get the constitution abrogated.
Already the constitutional referendum was characterized by massive fraud, which is not only well known to our people but also to the world. What is not so widespread is the knowledge that the rules stipulated that a majority of two-thirds of the total vote in three adjacent provinces can reject the constitution. This can be easily checked in both the Arabic and English version. So also according to the rules drafted by the U.S. itself, the referendum failed. But later the authorities retroactively re-interpreted the rules in a way that a two-thirds majority in EACH of the three provinces must say ‘No.’ So we warned the people that fraud is unavoidable, is intrinsic to the U.S. set up.
To a far reaching extent the alleged high turn-out is due to fraud. In the areas where the sectarian parties and lists have taken control they just stuffed the ballot boxes for themselves. The only place where this was not possible was the vast mixed districts of Baghdad. There not only did conflicts occur but the turn-out was also significantly smaller.
Q: At least in the Sunni population the resistance has been enjoying huge support. Isn’t it possible that some of the newly elected delegates will voice the demands of the resistance?
No, absolutely not. It is not a question of one or another MP speaking out for some demands of the resistance. This might even be possible as they want to gain the broad support of the masses. No, it is all about whether you accepted the American game or not. Regardless of the political banner raised by the lists, they help the so-called political process. The U.S. has understood that they cannot smash the resistance by mere military means. So they need to politically co-opt forces to rely upon. This is why the [U.S. authorities] did everything they could to have Sunni lists contest the elections.
Regarding the list of Duleimi, their background force, the Islamic Party (IP), has been openly collaborating with the U.S. since the onset of the occupation. For example, they took part in Bremer’s Governing Council and they accepted the constitution for the sake of being co-opted by the U.S. The IP is an American horse.
With Mutlaq and his list it is a little different. He comes from Falluja and he cannot afford to appear to be against the resistance. So he will be obliged to be sensitive towards the resistance. But in no way he can speak for the resistance. He has neither asked for authorization nor has this authorization been given. And you also see that his stance towards the constitution has already softened. While he first rejected it, he now puts the question in the background.
So participation in the elections eats at the table of the resistance and favors the occupation.
Q: Why, when, the resistance did not obstruct the elections by military force?
The resistance did not want to create conflicts with those who wanted to cast ballots even if they account only for a minority. If a member of a tribe gets hurt or killed [by resistance fighters] this means having the entire tribe against the resistance. These kinds of troubles should be avoided.
Q: You strongly attacked the Sunni lists for their participation but you did not do the same for Muqtada as Sadr, who did not even run on an own list but let his people run on the ticket of the Sciri and Dawa collaborators. Why this differentiation?
The political conditions within the Shia social environment are different. First, there is no armed popular resistance movement. Second, there is a powerful and rich clergy linked to Iran, which despite their political support for the U.S. puppet regime wields important influence due to religious reasons. And third, there is the direct Iranian presence by means of military and intelligence as well as by Sciri and Dawa, which constitutes a threat to all those fighting the occupation. Under the guise of rooting out Ba’athism they try to smash the resistance. By now they already have killed thousand and thousands of dissidents and tortured even more. When it comes to unleashing terror they do not rank behind the Americans.
So Muqtada has his hands tied. When his followers demonstrated on the anniversary of the fall of Baghdad the Western media reported that on the banners Bush and Blair were equalized with Saddam Hussein. [The media] tried to show that for the poor Shia masses the old regime is as bad as the occupation. While it is true that some such posters appeared, you have to look at the proportions. There was a sea of anti-U.S. anti-UK signs, while those against Saddam occurred only sporadically. This means that Muqtada, to avoid attacks by the pro-Iranian Shiite forces reproaching him for being close to Saddam, chose to let such signs be carried. But actually his focus of attention is against the occupation.
You should not underestimate the tensions within the Shia community. Underground the conflict between Muqtada on one hand and Sciri, Dawa and Co. on the other prevails while on the surface they have to grin and bear it. This is our reading of the situation and why we can understand the soft position of Muqtada. But the situation will come about when the conflict with the pro-Iranians and Iranians will explode. We have to be patient. We are only in the third year of the resistance.
Q: Many people say that there is a change in U.S. strategy not only because the resistance remains strong but also because Washington prepares for a conflict with Tehran. This implies the stepped up attempt to get elements of the Sunni community as well as of the resistance co-opted. In this way for example people interpreted the release of many political prisoners and of yourself. Do you agree?
It is clear that the U.S. are desperately seeking to get their so-called political process going. For this purpose they search also for collaborators in the Sunni environment. But this is not a new strategy.
By the way, this is also the argument put forward by the collaborators for participating in the elections. They claim that the U.S. has changed their approach and we subsequently should seize the opportunity by joining the so-called political process.
What is definitely wrong in your assumption is the evaluation of the Iranian factor. There is no real conflict between the U.S. and Iran. This is only masquerade. They are strongly unified in their aim to destroy Iraq as an Arab nation. And there is not even a difference between the Iranian factions, between the so-called moderates and radicals. Without the help of Iran the U.S. could not stay in Iraq. This is actually why we speak also of an Iranian occupation.
Q: There are persisting rumors about negotiations between the U.S. and the resistance. Is this true?
According to what I have heard the main factions of the resistance have decided not to start any negotiations at this point. So I can categorically exclude any such negotiations. If some individuals enter into dialogue with the occupiers then they have no authorization whatsoever to speak in the name of the resistance.
What is, however, true is that the U.S. is suffering too many losses and would like to withdraw as soon as possible to the military bases they set up all over our territory. They want to remain in the bases without being embarrassed by the daily attacks while announcing to the world that there is no more occupation.
They want to fill the ensuing power vacuum with troops from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Jordan. Their diplomacy is in full swing to get the Arab troops into Iraq relieving them. I believe that these puppet regimes will do that the U.S. wants them to do.
Q: What about the political front of the resistance forces you fought for and for which you presumably were incarcerated by the U.S.?
In last summer there was a conference which founded the Patriotic National Islamic Liberation Front of Iraq. It includes the Ba’ath party, the Iraqi Patriotic Alliance (IPA), the Iraqi Communist Party (Central Command) which is a split from the ICP as long back as the late 1960s as well as other political groups.
But for the time being nobody was authorized to represent the Front in public and even less so abroad. On the contrary there is a call to all those patriotic people living outside to return to Iraq and join the liberation struggle. Enough of big words, we want to see deeds. The IPA already released such a call to its members and sympathizers right after the start of the occupation. Unfortunately, few returned. They prefer the quiet life of exile to the struggle. And it is there where people who are susceptible to opportunism and collaboration. They hop from conference to conference using the resistance as their label increasing their price. To impede this, the Front refuses outside representation.
But we must be cautious. There are widespread sentiments among the resistance fighters to refuse the political arena altogether as the market place of personal interests and corruption. Many do not care to seize state power. They do not want to create another regime with all the diplomatic restraints serving only the U.S. as they know it from the entire Arab world. This is a result of all the disappointment. It is a sentiment which we certainly will have to overcome but at the same time we have to take it into account as a reality on the ground.
Q: But still this Front does not bridge the gap with the Shiite popular masses? Does the legacy of the Ba’ath party rule constitute the main obstacle?
Speaking in historic terms we will definitely defeat the U.S. from the moment we get Muqtada into the Front. This means we will spoil all the American plans to divide the country. But as I explained before, the conditions are yet not ripe. The conflict within the Shiite community must come to the fore. The humiliated popular masses need to revolt against the pro-Iranian forces. We will support them but we know that this will need time.
As to the Ba’ath party there is no such problem. Everybody understands that the old Ba’ath party and regime does not exist any more and will not return. A society is no mechanical apparatus which can be turned back into its previous position. The resistance of the people is changing everything. It is a kind of revolution going on. Everybody in Iraq talks politics. You feel a general politicization.
People accept those parts of the Ba’ath party who play an outstanding role in the resistance. For example when the different components of the resistance met, the Islamic ones included, the meeting was presided over by Izzad al Duri, one of the top leaders of the Ba’ath government. Nobody objected. But if the people are angry on those ex-Ba’athists who made big money and then turned the back on their country, they are fully right.
Furthermore it is clear that the government of a liberated Iraq must and can only rest on a very broad base and not only on one family or clan. The popular masses must have their say and will get the participation they long for. This is why I think that finally we will also have a liberation front together with Muqtada as Sadr and the poor Shia masses which follow him.
End of January 2006 Interview conducted by the Anti-imperialist Camp
